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The American Approach:
Public Funding, Law Reform,
and Staff Attorneys
E. CLINTON BAMBERGER, JR.*

Legal aid in the United States has three characteristics that I consider
fundamental, essentially immutable, and affecting the rational purposes of legal aid. Those characteristics are substantial public funding,
reform of the law for the benefit of the poor, and full-time salaried
lawyers specializing in the law of the poor. I will do no more than
describe those characteristics in the simplest terms, suggest some possible consequences and concerns, and turn to Professors Schlesinger and
Gordley for an analysis of other legal aid systems and how they compare
with legal aid in the United States.
A.

PUBLIC FUNDING

In 1962 about $4 million was donated by private sources to support
legal aid in the United States.' In 1967 the Legal Services Program of
the Office of Economic Opportunity made grants of $41 million dollars
for legal aid.2 For the fiscal year that began on October 1, 1976 the Legal
Services Corporation has an appropriation of $125 million to support
civil legal assistance for the poor.
When legal aid depended on private charity no one expected that
there would be sufficient resources to provide legal assistance to all the
poor. Whatever impetus for growth there was came from the leaders of
the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association. They set objectives
no grander than the establishment of offices in every principal city.
There were never enough resources or offices or enough lawyers in any
office to do more than assist a very small percentage of the poor.' The
poor were not involved in determining the policy of legal aid. What was
* Executive Vice President, Legal Services Corporation.
1. E. JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL
SERvIcEs PROGRAM 9 (1974).

2. Johnson, The O.E.O. Legal Services Program, 14 CATH. LAw. 99 (1968). For further
quantitative analysis of the OEO Legal Services Program, see E. JOHNSON, JR., supra
note 1, at 188-91.
3. See E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 1, at 188-91. See also Carlin & Howard, Legal
Representationand Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381, 410 (1965).
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done was done by lawyers.4
The infusion of public funds made legal aid for all the poor a possibility. The poor are now involved and, along with the legal aid lawyers,
they expect sufficient funds to give legal assistance to all who need but
cannot afford it. Some claim that the expectation is a political right.'
The cost of barely adequate legal aid for all the poor is roughly $500
million. That would support five attorneys for every 10,000 poor people.'
Although we spend much more for less important things than justice, if
we are to spend a half a billion dollars (or even when we spend a quarter
of that, as we do now) to provide lawyers for poor people, we must think
more about who else needs and cannot afford lawyers, and why anybody
needs so much lawyering. Some of that thinking has begun. Prepayment for legal assistance, legal cost insurance, and legal services as
a fringe benefit of employment are new interests of those people who live
between the poor and the rich and cannot afford the legal advice they
need. Their interests were stimulated by the growth and visibility of
legal aid for the poor.
There is now discussion of reducing the unmet need by
"delawyering." The tasks reserved for lawyers and the reasons for their
monopolies are not always clear. The scope of the practice of law is so
uncertain that it could be defined as the tasks clients will pay lawyers
to perform. Those tasks become the reserved practice of law and the
exclusive province of lawyers whether they are performed for the rich or
the poor. If public funds pay the bills of lawyers for the poor when nonlawyers can do the work as proficiently and at a savings, then clients
and taxpayers will question the monopoly. In response to these issues,
legal aid offices have expanded the use of para-legals to advise and
represent the poor, particularly in seeking and protecting welfare payments and other administrative benefits. Some bar associations have
4. Privately funded legal aid offices were vulnerable to restrictive pressure from local

bar and business interests which had offered financial support. J. CARLIN,
J. HOWARD &
S. MESSINGER, CIVn. JUSTCE ANM THE POOR 50 (1967).

5. Cf. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1322 (1966).

6. In contrast with this long-range goal of providing barely adequate services through
five attorneys for every 10,000 poor people, there are in the general population 14 lawyers

available for every 10,000 persons. The bare minimum nature of the five attorney goal can
be seen from the following: In a 1975 study, the Bureau of Social Science Research found
that 23 percept of the nation's poor face civil legal problems each year. Thus, for every
10,000 poor persons, there will occur approximately 2,300 legal problems each year-an
overwhelming case load by the standards of private legal practice. The rough cost estimate
of $500 million to provide this bare minimum of legal services to the poor people in the
United States may not be enough. This is supported by the experience of the legal services
programs which has shown that the average annual cost of funding one full-time legal
services attorney with supporting staff and facilities is at least $35,000. See Legal Services
Corporation Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1978, at 9-10 (1976).
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responded by seeking to prohibit non-laywers from "practicing law." It
remains to be seen just which tasks will succumb to the delawyering
process.
As the role of family, church, and private charity have declined we
have asked the law and its institutions to do more. If you are poor, you
depend on the law, regulations, and bureaucracies for the necessities of
life. A law, a regulation, and a bureaucrat dispense food through food
stamps, shelter through public housing, and medicine through Medicaid. The poor are over-regulated by law.
Providing more legal aid will accentuate the inquiry of whether we
need so much law in the lives of the poor. We must think more seriously
about what we expect of the law and legal institutions.

B. LEGAL Am: FOR WHAT PURPOSE?
The first public money for legal aid was distributed with the rhetoric
and philosophy of the War on Poverty, criticism of the old legal aid, and
the promise of something more for the poor. 7 Legal aid of the past was
accused of seeking only to assure representation. It was said to be concerned with.the form of due process-that the poor should have a lawyer
for their "day in court"-and not with the substance of injustice in the
laws that affect the poor. The new breed of legal aid lawyers was expected to redress the wrongs the law had inflicted upon the poor. The
law and the lawyers would make the poor not so poor.
Reginald Heber Smith, a leader of legal aid in the first part of this
century, contended that the substantive law treated the rich and the
poor alike. 8 He concluded that the poor suffered only because they did
not have access to the law and the courts.' If the poor had lawyers, they
would have the fairness guaranteed by the law to both the rich and the
poor.
The truth was and is that the law favors the rich and powerful, favors
landlords over tenants and sellers over buyers. William Gossett, a national leader of the legal aid movement, a past president of the American Bar Association, and former general counsel to the Ford Motor
Company, is a more credible authority for that view than I. He has said,
"[a]s every lawyer knows, there are appalling injustices in the laws
governing the relations between landlords and tenants . . . . So in
7. Address by E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., (Nov. 16, 1965), reprintedinNATIONALLEGAL
Am AND DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, 1965 SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE 43RD ANNUAL
CONFERENCE 17 (1966).
8. R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 13-16 (3d ed. 1972).
9. Id. at 33.
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most states, legislative changes in landlord and tenant law are long
overdue." 0
Legal services lawyers have assumed activist roles to effect change for
the clients they represent. That is the zealous representation the Code
of Professional Responsibility requires on behalf of every client." It is
not distinguishable from the devotion to the causes of the banks, businesses, and insurance companies that were clients of the law firm with
which I practiced for fifteen years. The obligation of legal aid lawyers
to seek change in the law for the benefit of the poor fulfills the aspiration
stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rules of law are deficient if they are not just, understandable, and
responsive to the needs of society. If a lawyer believes that the existence
or absence of a rule of law, substantive or procedural, causes or contributes to an unjust result, he should endeavor by lawful means to obtain
appropriate changes in the law ....

11

It should make no difference that the lawyer is supported by public
funds. What matters is that the just law is enforced and the unjust law
amended.
Law is a medium of economic and social power and lawyers are the
brokers of law. As the poor have access to more lawyers they will have
the chance to use the law to change existing relationships in order to
seek power and a better place in society.
C.

SALARIED LAWYERS OR JUDICARE?

Full-time, salaried lawyers have predominated in legal aid in the
United States from its beginning. The first government funding of legal
aid through the Office of Economic Opportunity was conditioned by the
agency's concept that the lawyers should be accessible in the neighborhoods of the poor. Lawyers in private practice cluster in the business and
financial districts; they are rare birds where the poor live. The traditional legal aid practice and the neighborhood law office concept favored
the employment of full-time legal aid lawyers.
Within a month after the federal effort began there were inquiries and
applications to allow the poor to select the lawyer of their choice to be
10. Address by William T. Gossett (Nov. 21, 1967), reprintedin LAw INAcTION 3, 21
(Dec.-Jan. 1968). The views of other respected observers is similar. See, e.g., L. DOwNME,
JR., JUSTICE DEmI: THE CASE FOR REFORM OF THE CouRTs 76-77 (1971); Address by Robert
F. Kennedy (May 1, 1964), excerpted in Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian
Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1315, 1337 n.27 (1964).
11. "The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law ....
REsPoNsimrrY

."

EC 7-1 (footnotes omitted).

12. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmBLIY EC 8-2.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
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compensated from the public fund. The proposal took the name
"judicare" from its medical counterpart. Its model was the British
scheme that began in 1949.13 The proponents of a judicare system argued
that the poor would be better served if they could choose from the best
and most experienced members of the bar. The possibility of payment
for work done for poor clients was an attractive concept for some.
In 1965, judicare had two principal advantages for promoters of effective legal aid. First, it would bring to legal aid the resources of the entire
bar-at least all who would accept the poor as paying clients." Second,
one could entertain the notion that, through the experience of serving
the poor, more lawyers would learn of the legal needs of the poor, the
complexities of the legal problems those needs involved, and the satisfaction gained from addressing those needs. Those lessons would generate more support for legal aid and its objective of equal justice.
However, unknown risks and perceived disadvantages suggested caution. Judicare was not likely to produce specialists in poverty law. Reform of the law might take longer under the judicare system. Three
lawyers, representing three different tenants evicted because they complained of the landlord's housing code violations, might each obtain a
delay of th6 eviction-but the pervasive problem would not be dealt
with, and the test case to prevent retaliatory evictions might never be
brought. 5 The costs would, most likely, be higher through judicare.
Salaried attorneys who become experts in problems of the poor and
design systems to expedite repetitive work should be able to render
comprehensive service at a lower cost."
To test the validity of those concerns, judicare experiments were
begun in California, Conecticut, and Wisconsin. The offices in California and Connecticut have closed, the Wisconsin program still operates,
and newer projects are functioning in West Virginia and Montana.
Major studies of the judicare experiments have reached contradictory
conclusions. 7 The authors of each assail the others for the biases of the
13. M. CAPPALLrT, J. GoRDLEY &E. JOHNSON, JR., TowARD EQUAL JUSTcE: A CoNPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL Am INMODERN Socm'rms 62 n.211 (1975). See generally S. POLLOCK,
LEGAL AID: THE FIRST 25 YEARs
(1975).
14. Address by E. Clinton Bemberger, Jr., to National Conference of Bar Presidents
(Feb. 8, 1966), excerpted in E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 1, at 119-20.
15. The hallmark decision prohibiting retaliatory evictions was obtained by a salaried
legal aid attorney in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016 (1969).
16. Address by Clinton Bamberger, Jr., supra note 14.
17. Compare S. BRAKFL, JuDicARE: PuSmc FUNDs, PRIVATE LAWYERS, AND POOR PEOPLE

(1974); Brackel, A Case for Judicare,59 A.B.A.J. 1407 (1973) and Brackel, The Trouble
with JudicareEvaluations,58 A.B.A.J. 704 (1972) with L. GOODMAN &J. FEuuLAN,

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE RuRAL POOR: JuDIc
AND
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researchers, the faults of the methodology, and the invalidity of the
conclusions. We have many more facts than we did a decade ago but
the validity of conclusions is not appreciably stronger. There must be
additional experiments, better data accumulation, and more valid conclusions. The Legal Services Corporation Act is beginning to fill this
need by requiring a report to the Congress on varying methods of providing legal services, including judicare.'8 The Corporation has made grants
for eight new judicare offices with requirements to produce facts that
will support research to measure effectiveness, cost, and client satisfaction.
It is interesting to note that the English, who began in 1949 with
judicare, have in recent years begun to imitate the full-time salaried
attorney model of legal aid found in the United States. The reasons for
change in England mirror the causes for skepticism about judicare in
the United States. 9
America is not the leader in the provision of legal assistance for the
poor. If we are to continue to be a society bound by law we must continue to expand the modes of access to the legal system. No people
among us have a greater need for legal assistance than the poor. As Dean
Cramton said, we have barely begun to provide equal access to the
systems that dispense justice.
THE DECENTRALIZED STAFF PROGRAM (1971); Goodman & Feuillan, The Trouble with
Judicare, 58 A.B.A.J. 476 (1972) and Wolf & Hissam, Legal Aid to the Poor in West

Virginia: A ComparativeAnalysis, 14 J. FAm. L. 405 (1975).
18. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, § 1007(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2296(g) (Supp. IV
1974).
19. See, e.g., ThE LEGAL ACTION GROUP, LAG INFORMATION SHEr 2: NEGHBOURHOOD
LAw CENTERs (1976); THE LEGAL ACTION GROUP, LEGAL Saavics FOR THE FUTURE (1974);
371 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1212, 1216, 1220 (1976).

